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Peter Cole
I. Postal^s Extended Cross-over Principle
Postal (l*?71, Chapter 10 inter alia) argues that the
fact that (l) is grammatical but (2) is not should be accounted
for on the basis of an extended version of the cross-over
principle. (For the purposes of this paper I shall consider
the extended cross-over principle to be that version of the
cross-over principle not limited to clausemates.)
(1) Who^ claimed Jack kissed her.?
(2) «Whoi did she^^ claim Jack kissed?
(a subscript i, indicates that the element in question is
coreferential with other elements similarly marked.) Sen-
tences (l) and (2) are presumed to be derived from an under-
lying structure similar to (3).
i V NP
' i. I
claim S
NP
''
VP ^
Jack V NP2
kiss i
In Postal's analysis of (l), \'Jh-Q-movement applies to
NP, . Pronominalization later applies left-to-right, as would
be expected. The derivation of (2) is similar to that of (l)
,
except that Wh-Q-movement applies to NP2 rather than to NP-j_.
Consequently NP2 is moved to the left of NP, . Since pro-
nominalization operates left-to-right except into embedded
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sentences, NP. should undergo pronomiiialization yielding the
structure underlying (2). However, (2) is ungrammatical and
its derivation must be blocked.
It should be noted that questions having •*.h3 form of
(2) are blocked only if NF^ and NPp are coreferential.
Hence (4.) is grammatical.
(4) ^Vho did Mary claim Jack kissed?
Indeed, (2) is fully grammatical if NP and NPp are not
coreferential.
Postal explains the ungrammaticality of the coreferen-
tial reading of (2) on the basis of the cross-over principle.
Although (1) and (2) come from the same underlying structure,
the application of Wh-Q-movement to NP^ (in the derivation of
(1) ) does not result in that NP crossing over the corefer-
ential NPp. However, when the same rule is applied to NP-
in the derivation of (2), NPp is moved across a coreferential
noian phrase, NP . Hence the extended cross-over principle
is violated in the derivation of (2), but not in the deri-
vation of (1)
.
It should be noted that for most rules the cross-over
principle must be limited to coreferential clausemates. Only
in the case of Wh-Q-movement, \Vh-re1-movement, and Y-movement
does cross-over apply across clause boundaries. If these
cases were explicable on the basis of other general principles,
the formulation of cross-over would be considerably simplified.
I shall argue that given certain fairly plausible
assumptions about the nature of underlying structure, cross-
over is not needed to account for the ungrammaticality of (2).
II. The Keenan Hypothesis
Edward Keenan ( 1971a, 1971b, forthccming) has proposed
that in order to account for the differing logical properties
of sentences with opaque and transparent readings, an under-
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lying structure similar to (6) is needed for (5).
(5) Mary kissed Jack,
(6) ^.S,
NP
Mary x Jack
That is, the sin^ilex sentence contains only variables. MP's
are treated as quantifiers binding variables.
III. Varieble Replacement
If noxm. phrases have the logical properties of quanti-
fiers binding variables, the transformational apparatus of
the grammar must be such that bound variables are replaced
by their quantifiers in some derived structures. Thus; in
order to derive (5) from (6), the variable x must be replaced
by Mary and the variable
^L hy Jack .
Some form of variable replacement is necessary in any
theory of grammar. If it is accepted that overt quantifiers
like all and some are logically related to the sentences in
which they are found in a manner similar to that represented
in standard logical notation, then a rule of variable replace-
ment is necessary so that the quantifier may appear within
the noun phrase in surface structure. Thus (?) must be related
by the grammar to (8).
(T) All men are chauvinist pigs.
(8) \fx{- man (chauvinist pig (x) )
2
Such a rule was proposed previously by George Lakoff (1969).
Lakoff refers to an apparently identical process as quantifier
lowering.
Although the question of v/hether rules like variable
replacement should be considered syntactic transformations
or rules of semantic interpretation remains controversial.
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the need for a rule like variable replacement somewhere in
the grammar is obvious. I sli?,!! assume throughout this
paper that variable replacement is a syntactic transformation.
Of course, some reformulation of my conclusions would be
necessary should it turn out that variable replacement must
be considered part of a separate semantic component. This
matter \vill be considered further later in this paper.
A somewhat modified rule of variable replacement is
necessary in order to derive (9) from an underlying structure
like (10).
(9) That Henry won the race confuses him.
(10) ^
NP --""
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be constrained from replacing more than one instance of a
v:.riable by the novn phrase which binds that variable. In
general, the variable replaced by th^ noun phrase would be
the left-most instance of that variable, although an instance
of the variable to the right of the left-most instance might
be replaced by the noun phrase binding it if the instance of
the variable to the right is in a sentence containing an
embedded sentehce S., and S. contains the left-most instance
of the variable. Variables not replaced by the noun phrases
binding them in underlying structure appear as pronouns in
surface structure. Of course, the above conditions on variable
replacement are directly analogous to conditions on pronominali-
zation in the standard theory.
IV. Variable Replacement in Place of
the Extended Cross-over Principle
I shall now show that the independently motivated
restrictions on variable replacement are sufficient
to explain the ungrammaticality of the coreferential reading
of (2). I will assume that v/ithin the general framework of
Keenan' s system the xmderlying representation of (l) and (2)
is not (3), but a structure similar to (13). The essential
difference between (13) and (3) is that in (13) the question
element is treated as a quantified noun phrase. Any other
treatment of Wh-questions would appear to violate my basic
assvunption that noun phrases are to be considered quantifiers
binding variables. (I do not claim that (l3) is an adequate
underlying representation for (l); rather, the only claim
is that who in (l) derives from a quantifier-like constituent
outside the sentence quantified over. The use of syntactic
features has only expository significance.)
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(13)
z kiss X
In accord vdth the rules proposed earlier in order to
deal with the derivation of (5) from (6) and (9) and (ll)
from (lO), variable replacement would apply to the left-most
instance of the variable x. (I am ignoring the replacement
of ;^ by NP;l' Nothing regarding NPy is crucial for this example.)
After the replacement of x by \Th, V/h-0-movement would apply
vacuously (or not at all). Thus (l) would be generated
from (13). That the derivation of (2) would be blocked is
apparent from the restrictions on the application of variable
replacement. In order to generate (2), the rules of the
grammar would have to permit the replacement of an instance
of a variable other than the left-most instance by its MP
(before Wh-moveraent) . However, the conditions on variable
replacement permit this only when the instance of the variable
to the right is in a sentence in which the left-most variable
is embedded. Since this is not the case in (13), sentence (2)
is blocked (i.e., it cannot be derived from (13), where the
instances of x are coreferential)
.
I wish to emphasize that the condition on variable
replacement (i.e., pronominalization) is necessary in any
theory of grammar. In fact this condition is precisely the
backwards condition suggested by Postal (1971, p. '20). The
virtue of the analysis I am presenting is that a known and
independently motivated principle of grammar is enployed in
place of a somewhat ad hoc rider on the cross-over principle.
The derivation of (a) , as well as the non-coreferential
reading of (2), indicate that variable replacement as formulated
above, and Wh-Q-movement are sufficiently powerful to account
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for the full range of cases. Sentences {^) and (2) are
repeated here for the convenience of the reader.
(4) V/ho did Mary claim Jack kissed?
(2) *V/ho. did she. claim Jack kissed?
^ ' 1 1
Sentence (4) derives from an underlying structure similar
to (13), hut containing an additional noun phrase.
(U)
NP.
(+Wh]
A
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V. V/h Marking
In the remainder of this paper I will attempt to sha/r
that all of Postal's arguments against the sort of treatment
of the phenomena in question which I presented above are
flawed. Postal's arguments are of two sorts. First, he claims
that only the cross-over principle can account for the proper
placement of Wh-elements in relative clauses in sentences
like (16), Second, Postal contends that restrictions on some
cannot accoixnt for the \mgrammaticality of the coreferential
reading of (2),
(16) The elephant who. thought he. didn't like Mary to believe
he. hurt himself, died of elephantiasis at midnight.
The problem is that of formally specifying the coreferen-
tial novm phrase which is marked as the unique V/h form.
Postal notes that in sentences like (16) only the left-most
coreferential element appears in surface structure as a Wh
form. Rejecting an explanation of this fact requiring that
pronominalization be cyclical. Postal concludes that
No other principle of English grammar or of universal
grammar is known which predicts this fact. The solution
to the pickout problem is the cross-over principle.
(p. 247)
However, we saw earlier that in the case of the coreferen-
tial reading of (2), the ungrammaticality resulted from the
misapplication of variable replacement. Sentence (2) can be
coreferential only if the left-most instance of the variable x
is replaced by the quantifier Wh, which binds it. Intuitively,
a similar process would appear to apply in the derivation of
(16). Let us ass\ime that (l?) underlies (16) at some point
in the derivation. (My use of (17)^ a tree of the sort
usually found in transformational grammars, hcs no theoroticol
significance. Since the point which I wish to make can be
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made equally well with (l?) as mth a structure more exactly
reprerssiiting the underlying logical relations of (16)
(i.e., 8 Keenan tree like (l5) ), the familiarity of structures
like (17) suggests that they he employed for expository
purposes
.
)
(17)
the elephant,
z
\ died of elephantiasis
at midnight
NP,
^-VP
V
thought
NP
/
NP„ VP
1^ / \
X V NP
I
\.
not like S/ X
NP VP
/
Mary V
\
NP
believe S/\
NP
4
VP
/ \
V NP,
hurt
The rule of variable replacement would apply left-to-right,
marking NPp with the Wh form. NP„, NP , and NP^ could not
undergo variable replacement (and later Wh-rel-movement) since
they are neither the left-most instance of the bound variable
X, nor are they in a sentence containing an embedded sentence
in which NP, appears. That is, assuming noun phrases to be
quantifiers binding variables, the correct solution to the
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problem of marking Wh forms in relative clauses is solved by
the application of an exceedingly general principle of variable
replacement. Since variable replacement is the direct analogue
of pronominalization in the standard theory, it is necessary
in any adequate grammar of English.
VI. Variable Replacement in Relative Clauses
There are some difficulties v/ith the application of
variable replacement to relative clauses. Variable replacement
has been formulated as an extremely general process accounting
for the incorporation of noun phrases as quantifiers into
simple sentences which contain only variables in imderlying
structure. It is obvious that the head noun phrase is not
incorporated into any of the instances of the variables it
binds in relative clauses. To do so would generate (l8)
rather than (l6) from (iT), and (20) rather than (19) from
the structure underlying ( 19)
.
(18) ^Vrtiich elephant thought he didn't like Mary to believe
he hurt himself died of elephantiasis at midnight.
(19) Tarzan slew the mean old elephant, who. thought ho-
didn't like Mary to believe he. hurt himself..
(20) ^Tarzan slew the mean old which elephant thought he
didn't like Mary to believe he hurt himself.
It is intuitively clear what the problem is. In the
case of relative clauses, the head noxm. phrase, which presumably
binds one or more variables within the relative clause, is not
incorporated into the embedded sentence. Instead, the sane
variable , which in simple sentences and V/h-questions is replaced
by the binding noun phrase, is marked as a Wh form and becomes
subject to V/h-rel-movement.
Thus, although the explanation of sentences like (l6)
on the basis of variable replacement seems clearly to
capt\ire the correct generalization, it entails a conplication
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of what was previously an extremely simple and elegant rule
of grammar. However, I do not believe that this complication
constitutes an argu?ient for the abondoninent of the hypothesis
that noun phrases are in fact quantifiers. It would be rela-
tively simple to have a separate rule of variable marking
(analagous to variable replacement) which would apply to the
structural description of relative clauses. Such a solution
would seem premature, however. It seems equally plausible
that: inadeqxiacies in our understanding of the logical relations
in relative clauses might account for the apparent anomaly.
Indeed, it is clear that the treatment of relative
clauses implicit here is incorrect in part. I have treated
the relation between the head noun phrase of the relative
clause and the sentence embedded in the relative clause as
though it were the same as the relation between a no\in phrase
and the simple sentence in which it occurs. However, the logical
relations between the men and the sentence x arrived are not
the same in (21) and (22).
(21) The men arrived. ^ ( (the men, x) x arrived)
(22) The men who arrived 'j.—'- ( (the men, x) x arrived, y)
Ignoring the definite description (which does not seem
relevant to this discussion), in (22) the head noun phrase
the men specifies a set S = \ment. The following sentence
defines a subset of that set: namely, those of the set men
who had arrived. This has(often been noted to be; the usual
fvmction of restrictive relative clauses in natural language.
It is obvious that no set-subset relation exists in (21). The
logical relations of (21) might be paraphrased roughly as
follows. Arrival is a predication attributed to all those
individuals of the class the men . Of course, the latter is
equivalent to saying that arrival is predicated of the
variables bound by the quantifier the men .
On the basis of the above examples, it would seem that
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the formal! :-;m which I have implicitly used for relative clauses
does not make the correct empirical clrims. Although I cannot
show that this is the case, I would hope that a more adequate
treatment of relative clauses within the framework of the system
developed by Keenan would also eliminate the complication of
the rule of variable replacement which I discussed previously.
It is not inconceivable that a more insightful treatment of
the logical relations in relative clauses would allow the
simple form of the rule of variable replacement to be used with
relative clauses. The reader should note that the deficiencies
in the underlying representation of relative clauses which I
have Just noted seem to be unconnected to the problem of
picking out the left-most instance of a variable in a relative
clause .
>
VII. Restrictions on Some
In the previous section I showed that the extended cross-
over principle is not the only principled explanation of the
fact that the left-most corcferential variable in a relative
clause is marked as the unique V/h form. In this section I
shall consider Postal's discussion of similarities in the
restrictions on some and \Vh forms.
In Chapter 21, Postal notes that there are similarities
between the restrictions on V/h forms and those on some . V/e
have seen that (l) is grammatical given a coreferential reading,
but (2) is ungrammatical for that reading. The same pattern
is true for (23) and (2/4).
(23) V/ho. first recognized Zeus created him.?
(24) *\7ho. did he. first recognize that Zeus created?
I.
It might be proposed that this pattern is related to the
fact that (25) is grammatical, but (26) and (27) are ungrammatical-
(25) Someone, first recognized that Zeus created him..
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(26) -"-Hg. first recognized thnb Zeus cro?.ted soiTisone.
.
(27) -"Vw first recognized that '.eus created someone..
Postal recognizes that the cpparent restrictions on
some in fact comply with the bocla/ards condition on pio-
noroinolizution. This is shorn by sentences like (29) and (30),
\Mch \.ould seem to derive fiom a structure similar to (2G).
/ort\ <ni X o J 1 • J soj-ie fiiii-,- J.J. T.. some finki(28) That Sandy lassed ^ ^ '.'as disturbing xo ^^ ^
^'i ''i
(29) That Sandy kissed some fink, was disturbing to him..
(30) It v/as disturbing to some fink, that Sandy kissed him..
Thus, Postal notes no difference in the restrictions on
pronominalization with some quantifiers.
On this basis Postal claims that sentences like (2)
and (23) cannot be blocked on the basis of the restrictions
on some . Since these restrictions are in fact restrictions on
pronominalization, it would have to be the case that the
restrictions on pronominalization are stable prior to those on
V/h-Q-movement . However, Postal claims to have shown earlier
that pronominalization follov/s \Vh-Q-movement . Thus, according
to Postal, the restrictions on pronominalization cannot be
used to block (2) and (23).
VTII. The Relevance of Postal's Argument
to the Hypothesis that Noun Phrases
are Quantifiers
A brief review of how Postal's argument affects the pre-
sent analysis is in order. My proposal does not attempt to link
V/h forms to some or to any particular quantifier. Instead, I
claim that all noun phrases are in fact quantifiers (or that they
bind variables like quantifiers). Pronouns (in the form of bound
variables) are generated in the underlying structure; the first
instance of a variable is either replaced by the noun phrase
binding it, or is marked as a Wh form in the case of relative
clauses, or both, in the case of V/h-questions . It has therefore
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heen an explicit assumption of my analysis that the analogue
of pronominalization, variable replacejr.ant, must be allowed
to occur before Wh--Q-movement. Hence any valid argument that
V/h-Q-movement must always precede variable replacement would
be fatal to my proposal. Thus Postal's claim that Wh-Q-movement
precedes pronominalization must be examined with greater
care, in order to see whether that argument is valid in the
case of variable replacement.
Postal (p, 80) contends that in order to generate both
(32) and (33) from (31)^ it is necessary that Wh-Q-movement
precede pronominalization.
(31) Charley, attacked V/h some of the men who hated Charley..
(32) V/hich of the men who hated Charley, did he. attack?
(33) V/hich of the men who hated him. did Charley, attack?
If pronominalization precedes V.Ti-Q-movement, then only the
second instance of Charley in (31) is in the correct environ-
ment for pronominalization. The first instance of Charley
cannot be pronominalized since the conditions for backv;ards
pronominalization are absent. However, if backwards pronominali-
zation cannot apply to (31), then (32) cannot be generated
—
given the assumption that the correct order is pronominalization,
then V/h-Q-movement . However, if V/h-Q-movement precedes
pronominalization both (32) and (33) may be generated. Thus
Postal concludes that the only possible ordering is V/h-Q-
movement followed by pronominalization.
The same arguments which Postal uses with regard to
pronominalization and Wh-Q-movement would appear to be valid
T/ith regard to variable replacement and Wh-Q-movement. Tree
(34-) shov/s the approximate underlying structure (excluding;
some) of (32) and (33)/ assuming that noun phrases should be
represented as quantifiers.
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31
(36) Which men who hated Charley, did he. attack?
Thus it would seem that in order to generate (36), it
would be necessary to predict that (35) is a well-formed
surface structure—if all instances of variable replacement
must precede Wh-Q-movement . That is, Postal's argument re-
garding the relative ordering of pronominalization and Wh-
Q-movement wovild appear to be valid with regard to variable
replacement and Wh-Q-movement. That this should be the case
is not surprising, since variable replacement is intended to
be analogous to pronominalization in every way. However, if
the correct ordering is Wh-Q-movement and then variable re-
placement, variable replacement cannot be used to block the
generation of (2), since if who is to the left of she at
the time variable replacement occurs there is no violation
of the backwards condition on variable replacement.
If the possible rule orderings are (a) all instances of
variable replacement precede Wh-Q-movement, or (b) Wh-Q-
movement precedes all instances of variable insertion, then
Postal's arguments in Chapter 21 constitute a refutation of the
main claim of this paper—that the rules of variable replace-
ment (pronominalization) necessary for any grammar of English
are sxifficient to explain the vmgrammaticality of sentences like
( 2) . I have contended that no extension of the cross-over
principle to those cases is necessary or desirable,
IX. Wh-Q-movement as an Anywhere Rule
In fact, there is another ordering possibility. If
Wh-Q-movement is unordered with respect to variable replace-
ment, the result will be the correct output. That is, I
propose that Wh-Q-movement is an "anywhere rule": a rule which
3
applies when its structural description is met. Of course,
in a sense Wh-Q-movement would continue to be ordered after
variable replacement, since the structural description of
Wh-Q-movement requires the prior application of variable
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replacement to the noun phrase marked Wh. However, if
Wh-Q-movement is an anywhere rule, it would apply as soon as
variable replacement moved the noun phrase marked Wh into
the sentence* The following derivations demonstrate that if
Wh-Q-movement is an anyv;here rule, both (32) and (33) can
be generated from (34).
c. NPa replaces z in S-. , yielding 'x attacked the
men who hated x' . Wh-Q-movement then moves NPz
to the front of the sentence, producing 'Vi/hich men
who hated x did x attack?' . This intermediate
structure is then subject to either forwards or
backwards variable ]?eplaceni>^nt. Both (37) and
(38) are generated by the rules of the grammar.
(37) Which men who hated Charley, did he. attack?
(38) Which men who hated him. did Charley, attack?
Since the general condition on variable insertion would
prevent the insertion of NP into S before the insertion of
NP , which contains S^, into S^ , the ungrammatical declarative
sentence (35) would be blocked,
I believe I have shown that if it is assumed that
noun phrases are quantifiers binding variables, and that the
transformation of Wh-Q-movement is an anywhere rule in the
post-cycle or final cycle, then there is no need to extend
the cross-over principle to Wh-questions
.
X, Constraints on Quantifier Crossing:
an Apparent Coxmterexample
If it is the case that noun phrases are quantifiers,
as I have claimed, it might be expected that they vrould obey
any constraints which exist on overt quantifiers. By
overt quantifier I mean words like all, some, etc. which
are represented as quantifiers in standard logical notation.
One characteristic often true of sentences with quantifiers-
first noted by Noam Chomsky (1957)—is that the passive
and active are not paraphrastic. For example, (39) is not
synonymous with ( 40)
.
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(39) All women love some men.
(40) Some men are loved by all women.
This does not seem to be the case with ordinary noun phrases,
however. Sentence (41) is synonymous with (42).
(41) Women love men.
(42) Jfen are loved by women.
Thus it might be claimed that noun phrases cannot be quan^
tifiers since, unlike overt quantifiers, their passives are
paraphrastic.
However, a closer consideration of sentences like (41)
and (42) suggests that the reason they are paraphrastic is
not because they do not contain quantifiers, but rather be-
cause the subject and object superficial noun phrases are
commanded by a covert quantifier which I shall call the "generic
quantifier"' (G) . The underlying representation for (41)
and (42) might be something like (43).
(43) ( (G, X (women, x) ) ;(v(G/ y (men, y) ) (y love x)
That is, novtn phrases are to be embedded within quantifiers.
The synonymy of (41) and (42) would then be explicable on
the basis of the fact that the crossing of like quantifiers
often produces no change in meaning. That this is true can
be seen from the following examples.
(44) All women love all men.
(45) All men are loved by all women.
Sentences (44) and (45) are synonymous. This contradicts
any claim that the crossing of quantifiers per se results in
non-synonymy. It has been claimed that only the crossing
of unlike quantifiers is non-paraphrastic. This is not correct,
however. McCawley (1970) has pointed out that when sentences
containing subject and object noun phrases with most are
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passivized, the active and passive do not mean the same.
(46) Most of the boys danced with most of the girls.
(47) Most of the girls v/ere danced with by most of the boys,
I assume most to mean mi^re than half. In situation (48)
sentence (46) is true, but (47) is not. Lines indicate who
danced with wnom.
(48) Harry-
Zippi
Moishe Jose
Mary Najet
Ahmad
Florence
Lew
Loretta
Three of the boys (Harry, Moishe, and Jose) danced with
three girls. Hence (46) is true. However, only two girls
(Mary and Najet) danced with three boys. Thus (47) is false.
In fact, I should not wish to claim without detailed
investigation that the crossing of any unlike quantifier
results in non-synonymy. If the definite description is a
quantifier as has generally been assumed, unlike quantifiers
are crossed in (49) and (50). However, no loss of synenymy
is immediately apparent.
(49) All of the guys love the new secretary.
(50) The new secretary is loved by all of the guys.
Clearly, a detailed examination of the crossing behavior of
5
natural language quantifiers is called for. Crossing behavior
does not seem to me to provide evidence against the hypothesis
6
that surface noun phrases are quantificational.
There may be some question regarding v/hether it is necessary
to posit a new quantifier G for generic noun phrases. One might
claim that generics are variants of the universal quantifier.
However, the incorrectness of identifying generics with the uni-
versal quantifier can be seen from the follo\d.ng examples.
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(51) All v/omen love all men.
(41) Women love men.
Sentences (41) and (51) are not paraphrastic. In (51) it is
claimed that each individual woman loves each individual man.
That is, under universal quantification the relation is pre€J*<?tav3
of each member of the class quantified over. This is n^t true
for generics, however. Although (41) claims that a love relationship
tends to hold between members of the class vjomen and members of
class mOT, it is incorrect to infer from this that such a relation-
ship holds between any particular members of those classes. Thus
the universal quantifier and the generic quantifier are n6t
identical.
XI. Noun Phrases as Predicates
An additional difficulty v/ith analyzing noun phrases as con-
taining quantifiers is intuitive rather than formal. In sentences
like (52) the surface noun phrase boys appears to function as a
predicate.
(52) They are boys.
However, in (53) my analysis requires that boif;s contain a quantifier.
(53) Boys like dogs.
Sentence (53) derives from an underlying structure like (54).
(54)
/
G boys X G dogs y x like y
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It vrould seem at first glance that in sone cases surface noun
phrases are quantifiers and in other cvjas they are predicates.
An intidtive inconsistency analogcus to this is found in
standard logical notation. Standard logical notation would
treat both boys and dogs as predicates in (53)^ but would analyze
Thelma and Hildepferde as logical constants in (56),
(55) V(x) (boy (x) ->V(y) (dog (y) -^like (x,y) ) )
(56) Thelma likes Hildegarde.
(57) Like (Thelma, Hildegarde).
Thxis standard notation reflects the claim that noun phrases,
v/hich in terms of surface syntactic relations seem to fxmction
similarly, actually have dissimilar logical properties.
Reducing the problem to its essentials, it is clear that
noun phrases have properties generally identified with quantifiers.
In particular, they bind variables. It is also clearly the case
that noun phrases often have the characteristics of predicates.
These qualities are not mutually exclusive. The noun phrase
boys in (53) seems to include the predication (52) in some
obvious v/ay. It '^eems useful to express this fact explicitly,
as in (58).
(58)
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in this paper I nested that Postal's backwards condition
must apply to variable replacement. The baclnvards condition
is quite similar in form to constraints on quantifiers pro-
posed by George Lakoff (1969). Roughly, Lakoff proposed that
if a quantifier Q commands a quantifier in \mderlying
structure, then Q is to the left of Q. in surface structure,
or Q commands (1 in surface structure and Q does not command
Q in surface structure.
a
The backwards condition can be phrased in an analogous way.
If x^ is the left-most instance of a variable x boiond by a quanti-
fie'r'Q in imderlying structure^ then x is the left-most instance
of X in surface structure, or x^ commands and is not commanded
by any other instances of x in surface structure. Lakoff s con-
straints deal with the position in surface structure of \mderlying
quantifiers, while the backwaixis condition deals with the position
in surface structxire of variables bound by quantifiers. Thus the
constraints apply to different constituents. The content of the
constraints is similar, however, suggesting that the two phenomena
in question may be related.
XII. Variable Replacement: Transformation
or Rule of Semantic Interpretation
Earlier in this paper I argued that some rule like variable
replacement is necessary in any theory of grammar. I left open
the question of whether there is any evidence suggesting whether
such a rule is a syntactic transformation or a rule of semantic
interpretation. Jackendoff (1969) has argued in his dissertation
and elsewhere that pronominalization is a rule of semantic inter-
pretation, Lakoff (1969) explicitly claims that quantifier lower-
ing is a cyclic transformation. Until the development of the ex-
tended standard theory, it was generally assumed that pronominali-
zation was a transformation. Within the framework I have proposed
pronominalization, quantifier lowering, and variable replacement
are different names for the same phenomenon. What I would like
to consider here is whether, assuming the correctness of my analy-
sis, there is any reason to believe that variable replacement is
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a syntactic transformation. I shall argue that there is in fact
evidence to that effect.
Crucial to my argument is the assu.Tiption that V/h-Q-movement
is a syntactic transformation. Although it is not impossible that
the preposed forms fovtnd in V/h-questions are generated by the base,
this v/ould lead to a host of problems. In particular, it wotild
have to be claimed that sentences vd.th transitive verbs lacking
objects are grammatical, but that they are marked anomalous by
the semantic component in those cases where there is no preposed
7Wh form. This analysis would seem unable to capture the fact
that sentences with objects and Wh questions asking about those
objects are intuitively a unitary phenomenon. I shall therefore
assume that Wh-Q-movement is a syntactic transformation.
Although Jackendoff et al. are less than explicit on this
matter, there is reason to believe that the supporters of the
interpretive framework would like to distinguish betv/een syntactic
transformations and rules of semantic interpretation in the following
way. Although syntactic transformations can be input to rules of
semantic interpretation, interpretative rules cannot be input to
syntactic transformations. However, if my analysis is correct, the
output of variable replacement must be input to Wh-Q-movement.
Thus, since Wh-Q-nxDvement is a syntactic transformation, its input
must also be a syntactic transformation.
I conclude that if my analysis is essentially correct, and if
Wh-Q-movement is a syntactic transformation, then variable replace-
ment must also be a syntactic transformation. Of course, the
acceptance of variable replacement as a syntactic transformation
would in no way show that the bifurcation of the rules of the
grammar into syntactic transformations and rules of semantic inter-
pretation is incorrect. However, it would seem counter to the
spirit of the lexicalist hypothesis if rules vdth the intuitively
"semantic" character of variable replacement \rrere to be included
in the syntactic component. I would hope that this would raise"
some question as to the fruitfulness of the division of the rules
of the grammar in this way.
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Footnotes
*Many of the ideas in this paper reflect my reaction to pro-
posals made by Edward Keenan during his lectures to the Seminar
on Mathematico-Philosophical Semantics, which he conducted together
ivith John Corcoran at the 1971 Linguistics Institute. The possi-
bility of treating the phenomena which Paul Postal explains by
the extended cross-over principle as an example of quantification
vras suggested by Jerry Mbrgan during classroom discussion of Pos-
tal' s Cross-over Phenomena . I have elaborated Keenan' s and Mor-
gan' s suggestions considerably, and they obviously bear no respon-
sibility for errors in my analysis.
Thanks are due to the Mathematical Social Science Board snd to the
Center for English as a Second Language, Southern Illinoi
J"
'Uni-
versity, for supporting ny participation in the Seminar on Mathe-
matico-Philosophical Semantics.
This is a siniplification of Keenan' s position. It is beyond
the scope of this paper to explicate Keenan' s motivation for pos-
iting underlying structures like (6). An earlier system with
similar logical properties is presented in Keenan' s dissertation
(1969); his current position was presented in lectiires at the
1971 Linguistics Institute and to some extent in Keenan (1971a
and 1971b) . A full exposition will appear in Keenan ( forthcoming)
.
In these works Keenan presents syntactic and semantic justification
for the treatment of surface noun phrases (including proper notms)
as having the properties attributed to quantifiers in standard
logics. Note that a somewhat similar proposal vras independently
put for\';ard in McCawley (1967).
For the purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to note
that if Keenan' s claim that .his system constitutes an adequate
treatment of logical presupposition in sentences vri.th transparent
and opaque readings is correct, this fact provides an independent
motivation for the treatment of putative cross-over phenomena cai
the basis of general principles necessary for Keenan' s system.
2
Or, Vx (man(x) —^chauvinist pig(y'\ ) in unrestricted quan-
tifier notativiji 'i.
3
Presumably, Wh-Q-movement is an anywhere rule anywhere with-
in the post-cycle (or final cycle)
.
I realize, of course, that until a formal semantics for G
is proposed in which the truth and falsehood conditions for G
are rigorously specified, these remarks are conjectural.
5
Lynette Hirschraan has made a detailed study of the effect
of quantifier crossing in the case of universal and existential
quantifiers.
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^1
In oriler to claim that all noun phrases are quantificational
I should be aole to demonstrate that there veason to believe
that all noLin phrases w..thout overt quuuLiiicr-3 contain covert
quanbifiers.
Jerry Morgan has noted some data which suggest that covert
quantifiers do not behave identically to overt quantifiers. In
Morgan's dialect (i) and (ii) are grammatical, but (iv) is not.
(i) Joe goes downtowi when he gets up.
(ii) When he gets up, Joe goes domitown.
(iii) Each boy goes downtown when he gets up.
(iv) *When he gets up, each boy goes downtomi.
For Morgan pronouns bound anaphorically to overt quantifiers
may not precede their antecedents. This is not the case in
regard to pronouns bovmd to covert quantifiers. I have no
explanation for these facts at present.
7
These facts were pointed out to me by Jerry Morgan-
Ul
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